77 ideas
13407 | All worthwhile philosophy is synthetic theorizing, evaluated by experience [Papineau] |
10911 | Part-whole is the key relation among truth-makers [Mulligan/Simons/Smith] |
10906 | Moments (objects which cannot exist alone) may serve as truth-makers [Mulligan/Simons/Smith] |
10907 | The truth-maker for a sentence may not be unique, or may be a combination, or several separate items [Mulligan/Simons/Smith] |
10909 | Truth-makers cannot be the designata of the sentences they make true [Mulligan/Simons/Smith] |
10912 | Despite negative propositions, truthmakers are not logical complexes, but ordinary experiences [Mulligan/Simons/Smith] |
10908 | Correspondence has to invoke facts or states of affairs, just to serve as truth-makers [Mulligan/Simons/Smith] |
1553 | No perceptible object is truly straight or curved [Protagoras] |
3509 | Externalism may be the key idea in philosophical naturalism [Papineau] |
13409 | Our best theories may commit us to mathematical abstracta, but that doesn't justify the commitment [Papineau] |
12583 | Belief truth-conditions are normal circumstances where the belief is supposed to occur [Papineau] |
1549 | Everything that exists consists in being perceived [Protagoras] |
13406 | A priori knowledge is analytic - the structure of our concepts - and hence unimportant [Papineau] |
7871 | Perceptual concepts can't just refer to what causes classification [Papineau] |
13408 | Intuition and thought-experiments embody substantial information about the world [Papineau] |
1545 | Protagoras was the first to claim that there are two contradictory arguments about everything [Protagoras, by Diog. Laertius] |
1547 | Man is the measure of all things - of things that are, and of things that are not [Protagoras] |
3305 | There is no more purely metaphysical doctrine than Protagorean relativism [Benardete,JA on Protagoras] |
3313 | If my hot wind is your cold wind, then wind is neither hot nor cold, and so not as cold as itself [Benardete,JA on Protagoras] |
3317 | You can only state the problem of the relative warmth of an object by agreeing on the underlying object [Benardete,JA on Protagoras] |
247 | God is "the measure of all things", more than any man [Plato on Protagoras] |
606 | Protagoras absurdly thought that the knowing or perceiving man is 'the measure of all things' [Aristotle on Protagoras] |
612 | Relativists think if you poke your eye and see double, there must be two things [Aristotle on Protagoras] |
7852 | The only serious mind-brain theories now are identity, token identity, realization and supervenience [Papineau] |
7864 | Maybe mind and body do overdetermine acts, but are linked (for some reason) [Papineau] |
7873 | Young children can see that other individuals sometimes have false beliefs [Papineau] |
7874 | Do we understand other minds by simulation-theory, or by theory-theory? [Papineau] |
7882 | Researching phenomenal consciousness is peculiar, because the concepts involved are peculiar [Papineau] |
7854 | Whether octopuses feel pain is unclear, because our phenomenal concepts are too vague [Papineau] |
7889 | Our concept of consciousness is crude, and lacks theoretical articulation [Papineau] |
7891 | We can’t decide what 'conscious' means, so it is undecidable whether cats are conscious [Papineau] |
7890 | Maybe a creature is conscious if its mental states represent things in a distinct way [Papineau] |
7885 | The 'actualist' HOT theory says consciousness comes from actual higher judgements of mental states [Papineau] |
7886 | Actualist HOT theories imply that a non-conscious mental event could become conscious when remembered [Papineau] |
7887 | States are conscious if they could be the subject of higher-order mental judgements [Papineau] |
7888 | Higher-order judgements may be possible where the subject denies having been conscious [Papineau] |
7860 | The epiphenomenal relation of mind and brain is a 'causal dangler', unlike anything else [Papineau] |
7862 | Maybe minds do not cause actions, but do cause us to report our decisions [Papineau] |
3513 | How does a dualist mind represent, exist outside space, and be transparent to itself? [Papineau] |
3514 | Functionalism needs causation and intentionality to explain actions [Papineau] |
7870 | Role concepts either name the realising property, or the higher property constituting the role [Papineau] |
7858 | If causes are basic particulars, this doesn't make conscious and physical properties identical [Papineau] |
3510 | Epiphenomenalism is supervenience without physicalism [Papineau] |
3511 | Supervenience requires all mental events to have physical effects [Papineau] |
7865 | Supervenience can be replaced by identifying mind with higher-order or disjunctional properties [Papineau] |
7892 | The completeness of physics is needed for mind-brain identity [Papineau] |
3515 | Knowing what it is like to be something only involves being (physically) that thing [Papineau] |
7879 | Mind-brain reduction is less explanatory, because phenomenal concepts lack causal roles [Papineau] |
20971 | Weak reduction of mind is to physical causes; strong reduction is also to physical laws [Papineau] |
7856 | It is absurd to think that physical effects are caused twice, so conscious causes must be physical [Papineau] |
7881 | Accept ontological monism, but conceptual dualism; we think in a different way about phenomenal thought [Papineau] |
3512 | If a mental state is multiply realisable, why does it lead to similar behaviour? [Papineau] |
7866 | Mary acquires new concepts; she previously thought about the same property using material concepts [Papineau] |
7850 | Thinking about a thing doesn't require activating it [Papineau] |
7851 | Consciousness affects bodily movement, so thoughts must be material states [Papineau] |
16369 | There is a single file per object, memorised, reactivated, consolidated and expanded [Papineau, by Recanati] |
7884 | Most reductive accounts of representation imply broad content [Papineau] |
7863 | If content hinges on matters outside of you, how can it causally influence your actions? [Papineau] |
7883 | Verificationists tend to infer indefinite answers from undecidable questions [Papineau] |
13410 | Verificationism about concepts means you can't deny a theory, because you can't have the concept [Papineau] |
7872 | Teleosemantics equates meaning with the item the concept is intended to track [Papineau] |
7869 | Truth conditions in possible worlds can't handle statements about impossibilities [Papineau] |
7868 | Thought content is possible worlds that make the thought true; if that includes the actual world, it's true [Papineau] |
3516 | The Private Language argument only means people may misjudge their experiences [Papineau] |
6016 | Early sophists thought convention improved nature; later they said nature was diminished by it [Protagoras, by Miller,FD] |
1580 | For Protagoras the only bad behaviour is that which interferes with social harmony [Protagoras, by Roochnik] |
205 | Protagoras contradicts himself by saying virtue is teachable, but then that it is not knowledge [Plato on Protagoras] |
1659 | Protagoras seems to have made the huge move of separating punishment from revenge [Protagoras, by Vlastos] |
532 | Successful education must go deep into the soul [Protagoras] |
1552 | He spent public money on education, as it benefits the individual and the state [Protagoras, by Diodorus of Sicily] |
7853 | Causation is based on either events, or facts, or states of affairs [Papineau] |
7857 | Causes are instantiations of properties by particulars, or they are themselves basic particulars [Papineau] |
20976 | The completeness of physics cannot be proved [Papineau] |
20974 | Modern biological research, especially into the cell, has revealed no special new natural forces [Papineau] |
20970 | Determinism is possible without a complete physics, if mental forces play a role [Papineau] |
20975 | Quantum 'wave collapses' seem to violate conservation of energy [Papineau] |
1551 | He said he didn't know whether there are gods - but this is the same as atheism [Diogenes of Oen. on Protagoras] |